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SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
quiring him to sell them prematurely for the benefit of the defraud-
ing defendant. Indeed, there is no need for mitigation in light of the
holding fixing damages on the date of public discovery of the fraud.
Regardless of what happens to the stock's price after that date, the
plaintiff's recovery will not be affected."'
The Harris court appeared to be guided by the policy of investor
protection underlying the federal securities laws. The holding in
Harris does not subject the defendants to a crushing financial bur-
den,172 yet makes them responsible for the consequences of their
fraudulent conduct. In this sense, Harris is similar to the other dam-
ages cases. Together, these cases indicate a gradual expansion of the
potential liability of securities law violators with an attendant aware-
ness of the need to avoid punitive sanctions which could dramatically
affect the professional securities and financial communities.
MICHAEL J. RowAN
II. TENDER OFFERS: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE
WILLIAMS ACT
A number of methods have been employed to effect the takeover
of a corporation. In the recent past, cash tender offers' have found
increasing favor in the eyes of persons seeking to gain a controlling
interest in a particular company.2 Cash tender offers are regulated by
"I See Cant v. Becker & Co., 379 F. Supp. 972, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also
Beecher v. Able, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,016 at 97,561 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1975)
(no need for plaintiff to mitigate damages in action under § 11(a) of 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1970), by selling stock after statutory date for measurement of damages).
'7 In addition to the protection afforded by the time limitation, the court further
required that Harris prove all the traditional elements for recovery under Rule 10b-5.
523 F.2d at 229 n.7. One of the most important of these elements is reliance by Harris
upon the defendants' omissions and misrepresentations, more accurately characterized
as causation in fact. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361 n.14 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in
Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b.5, 88 HARv. L. REv. 584, 587-96 (1975).
A tender offer consists of a public offer by a person or group, the offeror, to
purchase some or all of the stock of a corporation, the target company. The offer is
usually at a price slightly above the market price of the shares. See generally E.
ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973); Fleischer &
Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967).
' See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL XV,
(1973); Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 991 (1973).
1976]
970 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
the Williams Act,3 which seeks to protect tendering shareholders by
requiring that adequate information be provided on which to base a
decision to tender shares.4 Five percent beneficial owners' of any class
of stock registered pursuant to §12 of the Exchange Act' must report
information regarding their identity, the source of the funds used to
make the purchases, and the purpose of the purchases. 7 When a
tender offer is made, target company shareholders8 must decide ei-
ther to tender their shares for the price offered or maintain their
ownership and participate in the new enterprise.' In either event, the
information which must be reported pursuant to the Williams Act is
provided to enable these shareholders to make a rational decision
whether to participate in the outstanding cash tender offer.
The Williams Act fails to provide specific remedies for violations,
thereby compelling the courts to determine the proper relief to be
awarded."0 The preliminary injunction has been the most frequently
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 adding Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as the Williams Act].
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted at 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813-14. See also, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S.
49, 58-59 (1975).
1 Beneficial ownership of stock includes the ownership of securities in the name
of a person's spouse and minor children. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-7793 (Jan.
19, 1966), reprinted at CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 26,031. Concerted action by non-
related persons may result in a finding of a group status which is subject to the
Williams Act in the same manner as an individual. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d
709 (2d Cir. 1971); Twin Fair, Inc. v. Reger, 394 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); Water
& Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc. [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder], CCH FEn. SEC. L. REP. 93,943 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 1973). Prior to 1970, ten
percent ownership triggered the disclosure requirements under the Williams Act. Act
of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1)
& 78n(d)(1)(1970).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970). The
same information must be provided to the Securities Exchange Commission and to the
issuer of the stock if a person makes a tender offer which would result in that person
owning five percent or more of the stock sought to be purchased. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970).
See note 1 supra.
Even if the shareholder tenders his stock, it may not all be purchased. Section
14(d)(6) provides that if more than the requested number of shares are tendered, the
offeror must purchase those offered on a pro rata basis. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970).
"o Compare Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1505 (1976) (damages awarded to tender offeror for misrepre-
sentations by competing tender offeror and target company) with Otis Elevator Co. v.
United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (preliminary injunction
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employed device because it prevents violations of the disclosure pro-
visions of the Act, while providing an opportunity to correct errors in
the statements made by the parties." The tender offer is a sensitive
mechanism, however, and a preliminary injunction which delays the
development of the offer frequently impairs the chances of success.'
2
Permanent injunctive relief has also been recognized by the courts as
an appropriate remedy for effectuating the purposes of the Williams
Act.'3 A failure to distinguish sufficiently the distinct character of
permanent injunctive relief as opposed to the preliminary injunction
has led to some confusion concerning the propriety of granting either
type of relief, as well as the standards to be applied in making those
determinations.'4 Moreover, in granting injunctions the courts have
occasionally lost sight of the investor-protection purpose of the Wil-
liams Act.
A. Permanent Injunctions
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,"5 the target corporation
sought a permanent injunction against Rondeau, a private investor,
who had failed to file a timely Schedule 13D.16 Rondeau began pur-
chasing large amounts of Mosinee's common stock in April 1971.
Slightly more than a month later, he had acquired more than five
granted to enjoin any actions in furtherance of the tender offer when there is alleged a
violation of §§ 14(d) and (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§
78n(d)&(e) (1970).
" Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973). See also Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
947 (2d Cir. 1969); Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
1" See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 266-68
(1973). See generally Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23
Bus. LAW. 115 (1967); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Take-Over Bids, 45 HARv. Bus.
REv. 135 (Mar.-Apr. 1967).
,3 See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
" See text accompanying notes 63-75 infra.
25 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
" Id. at 53. Section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who. . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than 5 per centum [of any equity security of a class which is
registered pursuant to section 781 of this title] shall, within ten days
after such acquisition, send to the issuer. . . and file with the Com-
mission, a statement containing such . . . information . . . as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970). The Securities Exchange Commission has promulgated
Rule 13d-101 which sets forth the information required to be filed by five percent
owners of a class of stock. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1976).
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percent of the outstanding common stock of Mosinee, but had failed
to make the required filing. 7 Mosinee brought suit seeking to enjoin
Rondeau from voting or pledging the stock he owned and from acquir-
ing additional stock. Mosinee further sought divestiture of the stock
Rondeau already owned and damages.'8 The district court denied the
injunction holding that Mosinee had not shown irreparable harm.'9
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that Rondeau's failure to make
a timely filing of a Schedule 13D was sufficient to cause an injunction
to issue, even absent irreparable harm."0
The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the Seventh Circuit to
"reinstate the judgment of the District Court."' 2' The Court examined
Rondeau's activities against the investor-protection purpose of the
Williams Act 22 and found that Rondeau had not engaged or threat-
ened to engage in any activity which the Act was directed to pre-
vent.? Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, noted that the
Williams Act principally seeks to protect shareholders when a tender
offer is made for their shares. Section 13(d), 24 however, requires filing
whenever five percent or more of a class of securities is acquired,
17 Rondeau continued to purchase Mosinee's common stock until June 30, 1971,
by which time he had acquired over 60,000 of the 800,000 outstanding shares. Upon
receipt of a letter dated July 30, 1971, from Mosinee informing him that his purchase
might be in violation of the securities laws, Rondeau discontinued his purchases. He
filed a Schedule 13D on August 25, 1971, in compliance with Rule 13d-1. See note 16
supra. Thereafter, Mosinee informed its shareholders by letter and a simultaneously
released newsletter that Rondeau had violated federal law and that their stock was
undervalued in the over-the-counter market. 422 U.S. at 53-54. Mosinee commenced
this action after Rondeau filed a Schedule 13D.
,1 422 U.S. at 55. Mosinee also sought a preliminary injunction; however this
motion, made with the complaint, was subsequently withdrawn. Id.
,1 354 F. Supp. 686, 693-94 (W.D. Wisc. 1973), rev'd 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974),
rev'd 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
20 500 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd 422 U.S. 49 (1975). The Seventh
Circuit determined that Mosinee, in its position as issuer of the shares, was best able
to enforce the Williams Act. Therefore, since there was a violation of the Act, albeit a
technical one, Mosinee was allowed to enforce it, here by means of a permanent
injunction. 500 F.2d at 1016-17.
21 422 U.S. 49, 65 (1975).
Id. at 58. The Court stated that:
[t]he purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public share-
holders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will
not be required to respond without adequate information regarding
the qualifications and intentions of the offering party.
Id. (footnote omitted).
23 Id. at 59.
2, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970). See note
16 supra.
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whether or not a tender offer is made. Indeed, an acquisition of that
magnitude could "lead to important changes in the management or
business of the company . . . ."I Nevertheless, the Court did not
consider Rondeau's activities to be of the sort from which Congress
sought to protect investors. 6 Rondeau had not made a tender offer
for Mosinee stock, and therefore, the shareholders of Mosinee were
not under pressure to sell their stock without the benefit of essential
information. Thus, the tardy filing of the Schedule 13D was sufficient
to protect Mosinee shareholders." Since the shareholders were ade-
quately protected, irreparable harm would not result from a denial
of injunctive relief.
The Court then reviewed the Seventh Circuit's determination
that irreparable harm need not be shown. The majority concluded
that simply because Mosinee was attempting to protect investors by
enforcing the Williams Act, "it [was not] relieved of showing irre-
parable harm and other usual prerequisites for injunctive relief.""
The Court made no distinction between preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief. Rather, "the traditional standards for extraordinary
equitable relief" were held to apply to the case" and irreparable harm
was thus recognized as a prerequisite to injunctive relief generally.2
21 H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted at 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5025, 5028.
28 See text accompanying note 35 infra. Senator Williams, the sponsor of the Act,
has stated that the Act was intended to protect investors during tender offers. 113
CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams). See generally S. REP. No. 550,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted
at 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2811. In this case, Rondeau had not made a
tender offer. However, he did indicate in his Schedule 13D that he was contemplating
such action. Furthermore, the district court found that there was no concrete evidence
that Rondeau intended to obtain control of Mosinee prior to his receipt of the July 30th
letter from Mosinee. 354 F. Supp. 686, 690 (W.D. Wisc. 1973). See note 17 supra. The
Seventh Circuit did not dispute this finding and noted that they were "giving effect"
to the district court's determination "that [Rondeau's conduct] was unaccompanied
by a tender offer or proxy solicitation." 500 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1974).
- 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975).
Id. at 65.
22 Id. at 57. The Court relied on Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959). In Beacon Theaters, the Court held that injunctive relief is not proper absent
a showing of irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies. 359 U.S. at 506-07.
This standard had been continually upheld for both permanent and temporary injunc-
tive relief. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974).
11 The same standards were considered despite the difference between permanent
and preliminary injunctions. A preliminary injunction is generally issued to preserve
the status quo which exists immediately prior to the contested circumstances pre-
sented in the litigation. American Radiator Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 483 F.2d 1, 4
1976]
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The Court's examination of the factual setting in Rondeau re-
sulted in a finding that irreparable harm was not present and there-
fore that a permanent injunction should not have been granted .
3
Given the investor-protection purpose of the Act,32 Rondeau's failure
to file a timely Schedule 13D absent a tender offer for the shares could
not have irreparably harmed the shareholders. The shareholders had
not been presented with a tender offer which compelled them to make
an investment decision based on insufficient information. Indeed,
Rondeau complied with the Williams Act by filing a Schedule 13D
as soon as practicable after learning of his duty to file. 33
The Court further noted that since the shareholders were not
harmed by Rondeau's dilatory filing, the permanent injunction would
serve only a punitive purpose. The investors did not need protection
from Rondeau's activities; therefore, the relief granted served merely
as a penalty for the technical violation. Moreover, the Court also
considered that, as Rondeau alleged, the violation of the Williams
Act was unintentional resulting from a lack of familiarity with the
requirements of the Act.
3 4
In Rondeau, the Court was confronted with determining the pro-
priety of permanent injunctive relief under the circumstances pre-
sented. No distinction was made between permanent and prelimi-
nary injunctions; rather, the Court spoke only in terms of "injunctive
(5th Cir. 1973); District 50, U.M.W. v. Union of U.M.W., 412 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969). Permanent injunctions are generally issued to prevent recurring interference
with another party's legal rights. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Bhd. of
Electrical Workers, 133 F.2d 955, 957 (7th Cir. 1943). Thus, permanent injunctive relief
is intended to provide a final solution to the problem presented. D. DOBBS, THE: LAW
OF REMEDIES 106 (1973). Since the effect of the issuance of such relief is continuous, a
more detailed review of the facts by the court is essential. This is the approach adopted
by the Supreme Court in Rondeau. The transitory nature of preliminary injunctions
should, therefore, demand a less complete analysis by the issuing court. The differ-
ences in the nature of the remedies and in the standards to be applied in granting the
two types of injunctive relief have not always been recognized. See Klaus v. Hi-Shear
Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) and text accompanying notes 63-75 infra. See also
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 994 (1965).
3' 422 U.S. at 59.
32 See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
See Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1020 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell,
J., dissenting). Rondeau also updated his filing approximately one month after the
initial filing in order to "reflect more accurately the allocation of shares between
himself and his companies." 422 U.S. 49, 54 (1975).
3 422 U.S. at 55. Rondeau had contended that he was unaware of the 1970 amend-
ments to the Act which reduced the amount of stock ownership filing requirement from
ten to five percent.
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relief."' Moreover, Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover," a prelimi-
nary injunction case, was relied on by the Court in its discussion of
the standards applicable to the granting of injunctive relief. This
analysis indicated that the Court, in Rondeau, may have been seek-
ing to affect the treatment accorded by the courts to preliminary as
well as permanent injunctions. The continued reference to injunctive
relief, without specifying the permanent injunction granted by the
Seventh Circuit in Rondeau, allows the Court's opinion to be read to
permit the granting of preliminary injunctive relief only when tradi-
tional equitable principles for preliminary relief are met. This result,
however, has not uniformly followed from the Court's decision.
37
B. Preliminary Injunctions
The preliminary injunction is the most frequently requested relief
under the Williams Act.38 Target companies, whose management per-
ceive the tender offer as a threat to their position or as detrimental
to the corporation generally, often seek an injunction to thwart a
potential takeover. 9 The request for a preliminary injunction to en-
join the consummation of a tender offer is commonly based on alleged
violations of the antitrust and securities laws." Recently the courts
have more closely scrutinized the allegations of target companies
seeking to defend against tender offers. This trend may be a function
3 Chief Justice Burger stated that the question before the court was "whether a
showing of irreparable harm is necessary for a private litigant to obtain injunctive relief
in a suit under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... 422 U.S. 49, 50-
51 (1975). No discussion regarding the differences in the nature of permanent and
preliminary injunctive relief was undertaken. See note 30 supra.
u 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
37 See text accompanying notes 52-59 and note 77 infra.
3' See note 11 supra.
1' See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-22
(1973); Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.
L. Rzv. 991, 995 (1973). See also Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense
Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967).
40 The target management most often includes allegations of both securities and
antitrust laws violations. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d
851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2nd Cir. 1973); Otis Elevator Co. v. United States
Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal,
403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Less frequently an allegation of violations of the
securities laws will be made without any allegation of antitrust law violations. See,
e.g., Universal Container Corp. v. Horowitz, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder], CCH FED.
SEC. L. REp. 95,382 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1975); Twin Fair, Inc. v. Reger, 394 F. Supp.
156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
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of both the Supreme Court's decision in Rondeau4' and the particular
facts of the cases before the courts.
In Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 2 the target company, Copperweld,
sought to enjoin Imetal's tender offer by alleging violations of the
securities laws,43 and that completion of the tender offer would violate
the Clayton Act." The court reviewed the standards currently being
employed to determine if a preliminary injunction should issue. For-
saking the test previously utilized by the court of appeals in its
circuit, the district court adopted the "less stringent" test employed
by the Second Circuit.45 Following that standard, the court analyzed
the plaintiffs allegations to determine if Copperweld had shown seri-
ous questions regarding the merits and a balance of hardships tipped
decidedly in its favor.46 The district court found that only one of the
ten counts alleged in the complaint presented serious questions going
to the merits, thus meeting the first part of the less stringent test.47
A 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
12 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
13 Copperweld alleged violations of §§ 10(b), 13(d), 14(d) and 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(d), 78n(d) and 78n(e) (1970), and rules promul-
gated thereunder. 403 F. Supp. at 586.
11 Copperweld alleged inter alia that Imetal was a "potential competitor" under
the theory of United States v. Falstaff, 410 U.S. 526 (1973) and § 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970). 403 F. Supp. at 586-87.
11 The Third Circuit, where the Copperweld court was located, required that for
a preliminary injunction to issue the moving party must show (1) a reasonable proba-
bility of success on the merits, and (2) that irreparable harm will be suffered if the
injunction is denied. Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Transp.,
Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 460
F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam); A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
440 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1971). This test is generally recognized as the traditional test for
preliminary injunctions. Therefore, the test comports with the Supreme Court's intent
expressed in Rondeau that "traditional prerequisites of extraordinary equitable relief"
be met before injunctive relief should issue. 422 U.S. at 61.
The Second Circuit, however, has developed a "less stringent test" for preliminary
injunctions. 403 F. Supp. 579, 586 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Under that test, the moving party
is required to show only that (1) he has raised serious questions going to the merits
and that (2) the balance of hardships is tipped decidedly in his favor. Missouri Port-
land Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883
(1974); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953).
"1 403 F. Supp. 579, 587 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See note 45 supra. The court chose the
Second Circuit test because the Third Circuit had favorably cited Second Circuit cases
employing the "less stringent test," and because Copperweld "had not shown a likeli-
hood of success [on the merits]" and would therefore be dismissed pursuant to the
traditional test. Id. The court's generous attitude in choosing the less stringent test
was not maintained throughout the opinion. See text accompanying notes 57-64 infra.
" 403 F. Supp. at 592, 608.
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Despite having met the requirement of presenting serious questions
going to the merits, that count was also dismissed. The court held
that the second portion of the test, that the moving party must have
the balance of hardships tipping decidedly in his favor, could not be
utilized in light of Rondeau.18 Thus, absent a showing of irreparable
harm, a preliminary injunction could not be granted.49
The district court indicated that Rondeau required a finding of
irreparable harm for an injunction to issue. The court likely consid-
ered Rondeau to call for a return to traditional equitable principles,
rather than as a mandate for a finding of irreparable harm as a
requisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Copperweld,
therefore, is consistent with the spirit of Rondeau and the legislative
purpose of the Williams Act. The court, noting that the Act is not
meant to provide incumbent management with an additional weapon
to defeat tender offers, reviewed Imetal's Schedule 13D disclosures
and determined that Copperweld shareholders had adequate infor-
mation on which to make the decision to tender or refrain from tend-
ering their shares. Copperweld's complaint was scrutinized carefully
by the court. 0 This scrutiny evinces a policy of requiring target com-
pany management to do more than merely allege antitrust and secur-
ities laws violations in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
The primary concern of the court in Copperweld was the protection
of the target shareholders, and the strict factual analysis was conso-
nant with that concern.
5'
11 Id. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 608. The court referred to Copperweld's case as "weak" and based on
speculation.
51 Id. The district court, in its discussions of the numerous counts alleged by
Copperweld, variously noted that "plaintiff's factual footing is at best tenuous," id.
at 596, and that ultimately "Copperweld's case [is] weak." Id. at 608.
The fundamental purpose of the Williams Act, providing tendering shareholders
with adequate information regarding the offer and the offeror, S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967), was also considered of paramount importance in Mesa Petro-
leum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976). Mesa Petroleum
initiated a tender offer for Aztec's stock. Aztec's management. decided to oppose the
offer and sent letters to Aztec shareholders informing them of their decision. Aztec's
management also refused to honor Mesa Petroleum's request to supply shareholder
lists for the purpose of mailing the offering materials to Aztec shareholders. Mesa
Petroleum brought suit to obtain the lists, and Aztec counterclaimed for preliminary
injunctive relief alleging that a successful tender offer by Mesa Petroleum would vio-
late the antitrust laws. The court, noting Rondeau, denied Aztec's request, and held
that since Aztec could not show a sufficient probability of success on the merits, a
preliminary injunction could not be granted. Moreover, the court granted the request
for production of the shareholder lists in order to insure that Aztec shareholders would
1976]
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This close examination of target company pleadings has also been
employed by the Southern District of New York. In Otis Elevator Co.
v. United Technologies Corp. ,52 Otis Elevator, the target company,
sought to enjoin United Technologies from completing its tender offer
due to United's failure to disclose its intent to merge with Otis upon
successful completion of the tender offer. The court found that
United's failure to disclose the merger plans made its purchase offer
"not only materially misleading but. . . false."53 Thus, the court held
that Otis had shown probable success on the merits and therefore had
overcome the first of two obstacles in its efforts to obtain preliminary
injunctive relief." The second test which the court applied related to
the balance of hardships which would result from the consummation
of the tender offer. Utilization of this test in conjunction with the
probable success on the merits requirement produced a unique stan-
dard for preliminary injunctive relief.
5
be adequately informed about the tender offer. In this way, the shareholders are pro-
vided with the information they need to make their tender decision and the purpose
of the Williams Act is effectuated. The court was vigilant in the protection of the Aztec
shareholders without acquiescing to the allegations of Aztec's management.
Target management was also unsuccessful in its judicial attempts to defeat a
tender offer in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter & Co., 406 F. Supp. 984
(E.D. Mo. 1975). Porter offered to purchase Missouri Portland stock and was initially
defeated by a preliminary injunction due to material misstatements and omissions in
their offer. The offer was quickly amended only to be challenged again several days
later. The district judge scrutinized the second offer made by Porter and determined
that Missouri Portland's allegations, and the evidence offered to sustain the allega-
tions, were insufficient to show a "substantial probability of success at a subsequent
trial." Id. at 991. The court stated throughout the opinion that the shareholders were
being provided with sufficient information on which to base their investment decision.
Thus, the purpose of the Williams Act was once more effectuated.
The Supreme Court's instruction on the purpose of the Williams Act in Rondeau
thus seems to have guided the lower courts to consider the cases with the target
company shareholders in particular when determining whether to grant injunctive
relief. Moreover, the lower courts are also maintaining a balance between the offeror
and target management, a result specifically called for in the legislative history of the
Williams Act, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967), and Rondeau, 422 U.S.
at 58-59.
52 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
11 Id. at 969. The court noted further that the merger plans were sufficiently
prepared and were attributable to United Technologies as an entity so as to be subject
to the disclosure requirements of § 14(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n(d)(1)
(1970). 405 F. Supp. at 973.
11 405 F. Supp. at 973. The test employed by the court at this point was identical
to that utilized in the Third Circuit. See note 45 supra.
11 See notes 45-46 supra. The test employed by the court in Otis combined the first
portion of the Third Circuit standard and the second part of the Second Circuit stan-
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
In applying this standard, the court scrutinized the pleadings and
the evidence and found that a preliminary injunction could not pro-
perly be granted for injury to Otis. " Nevertheless, the court found
that a preliminary injunction would be necessary to protect the inter-
est of Otis shareholders. 7 The court realistically viewed the situation
presented and effectuated the purpose of the Williams Act without
"tipping the balance either in favor of management or in favor of the
person making the takeover bid."58 Furthermore, by specifically pro-
viding for the protection of those shareholders presented with the
tender offer, the court ensured that the shareholders would not be
forced to act without adequate information. Although the Otis court
made no reference to Rondeau, the analysis employed and the careful
examination by the court of the violations alleged is consistent with
the approach utilized by the Copperweld court which relied on
Rondeau. In Otis, the court did not require a showing of irreparable
harm.59 However, the result reached was in line with the Rondeau
theme. The target company was not provided with a "weapon" to
defeat the tender offer and the tendering shareholders were ade-
quately protected.
The Southern District of New York did rely on Rondeau in an-
other preliminary injunction case under the Williams Act. In Myers
v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc.," the district court de-
nied a motion for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiff could
not show irreparable harm." Indeed, the plaintiff had omitted any
dard. The Otis standard is the reciprocal of the test used in Copperweld. See text
accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
' 405 F. Supp. at 973.
' Id. at 973-74. Otis claimed that it was harmed in its corporate capacity by
United's failure to disclose its plan to merge with Otis. The court found, however, that
Otis was not harmed by this violation of § 14(d) of the Exchange Act. Although the
corporation was not harmed, the failure to disclose the plans was peculiarly vital to
the Otis shareholders in the tender offer context. They would be compelled to make
the decision to remain in the company or tender their shares without the knowledge
that a merger, which could increase the value of the shares, was impending. The court
found that this was the interest being harmed by the inadequate disclosure by United.
Id.
, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). The Court also noted that "it
should take with a grain of salt the claim of 'jitters in executive suites.'" 405 F. Supp.
at 973, quoting Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 869 n.36,
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
51 405 F. Supp. at 973-74. The balance of hardships test was employed by the court
in its determination of the issues presented. The court apparently recognized Rondeau
as dealing solely with permanent injunctions and having no direct bearing on this case.
402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" Id. at 215.
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reference to irreparable harm in his complaint. Thus, in the court's
view, Rondeau was dispositive of the preliminary injunction issue. 2
The court, ignoring the balance of hardships test, impliedly cast it
aside as improper in light of Rondeau. While the analysis of the
courts in Myers and Otis conflicts, both courts sought to pierce the
pleadings and confront the problems alleged to be present. This
brought about compatible results despite the courts' difference of
opinion on the precedential value of Rondeau. 3
The effect of Rondeau on standards for granting preliminary in-
junctions has been reviewed only once in the courts of appeals. In
Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp. ," the Ninth Circuit was presented with the
issue of whether a preliminary injunction should issue for an alleged
violation of §14(e) of the Exchange Act. 5 Klaus had been attempting
to gain control of Hi-Shear for several years. Hi-Shear had retaliated
by increasing the amount of its outstanding stock to prevent Klaus
from achieving a controlling position. Klaus sought preliminary in-
junctions against the allegedly improper defensive tactics employed
by Hi-Shear. 66 The district court awarded Klaus preliminary injunc-
62 Id.
" In Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. T 95,364, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1975), the district court employed the same practical
viewpoint in a similar type of case. Crane offered debentures to Anaconda shareholders
in order to obtain approximately 22% of Anaconda's shares. In the battle that ensued,
both parties alleged wrongdoings on the part of the other. Since this was an exchange
offer, the Williams Act did not apply. Nevertheless, the protection of tendering share-
holders remained the primary goal. The court once again carefully scrutinized the
pleadings, and held that Anaconda's shareholders would be best protected by permit-
ting the exchange offer to continue. Just as in Otis, see text accompanying notes 52-
59 supra, the balance of hardships test was used to determine the propriety of issuing
injunctive relief. Finally, the shareholders and not the target company management
were at the center of the court's attention. This focus thus implements the directive
in Rondeau to protect investors in tender offer situations.
528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
66 Hi-Shear responded to Klaus' first tender offer by purchasing over 600,000 of
its outstanding shares and sold 130,000 of these to a wholly owned subsidiary, Caribe.
Klaus made a second tender offer in which he obtained approximately 45% of the
outstanding shares of Hi-Shear. Klaus believed that the 130,000 shares held by Caribe
were non-votable, which would have given him over 50% of the voting stock. Klaus
demanded a stockholders meeting which took place nearly three months later. In the
interim, Hi-Shear issued another 180,000 shares which were to be voted in favor of Hi-
Shear management. Moreover, Klaus also learned during this period that the Caribe-
held shares were outstanding and would be voted by Hi-Shear management. Klaus
thus sought a preliminary injunction to prevent these shares from being voted at the
impending meeting of Hi-Shear stockholders. 528 F.2d at 228-29.
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tions on some, but not all, of the claims. 7 Both parties appealed from
that determination, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's
granting of preliminary injunctions because "the court applied an
improper test for the availability of injunctive relief."6 8
The district court had concluded that the management of Hi-
Shear should not be allowed to vote the improperly issued stock pend-
ing the outcome of the trial on the merits.69 The lower court consid-
ered Klaus' claims and found that the balance of equities was such
that Klaus should prevail on several counts." The balance of equities
standard employed by the district court was improper, according to
the Ninth Circuit, in light of Rondeau.7 ' The court of appeals stated
that "[t]he Supreme Court . . . restricted the availability of injunc-
tive relief to either of the parties contesting a takeover bid for an
alleged violation of the federal securities laws." 2 The circuit court
further concluded that Rondeau required that irreparable harm be
shown before a preliminary injunction could be granted. Thus, the
case was remanded to the district court for consideration of Klaus'
claims, subject to the requirement of a finding of irreparable harm
before a preliminary injunction could be granted.
The Ninth Circuit construed Rondeau in the same manner as the
Copperweld and Myer courts. The irreparable harm standard for per-
manent injunctive relief, as set forth in Rondeau, was transposed to
a preliminary injunction context without change. This mechanical
use of Rondeau fails to recognize the inherent differences between
permanent and preliminary injunctive relief.3 Therefore, the opinion
17 Klaus was denied a preliminary injunction to prevent the voting of shares held
by two companies which Hi-Shear acquired, during the interim, by a transfer of Hi-
Shear stock for the outstanding shares of the acquired companies. All other prelimi-
nary injunctive relief sought by Klaus was granted. 528 F.2d at 229-30.
11 Id. at 231. The court of appeals noted that while the granting of equitable relief
lies within the sound discretion of the court, the holding of the lower court would
properly be vacated since it was based on an "erroneous legal premise." Id.
at Id.
10 See note 66 supra.
71 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
712 528 F.2d at 231.
71 See note 30 supra. Failure to distinguish between permanent and preliminary
injunctions has characterized those opinions which have considered preliminary in-
junctions in light of Rondeau. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F.
Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa.
1975); Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). Other courts have not considered Rondeau in their discussion of preliminary
injunctions. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder], CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,364 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1975); Otis Elevator Co. v. United
Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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in Klaus may lead to further confusion regarding the effect of
Rondeau. Moreover, the instructions given to the district court by the
Ninth Circuit in Klaus were unclear and did not relate specifically
to the standards which must be applied on remand .7 The court of
appeals apparently indicated that the lower court's attention should
be directed toward the tendering shareholders to the exclusion of the
other parties. This narrow approach to the issues does not comport
with Rondeau. 5 Perhaps the ambivalent character of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's instructions will allow the circumvention of that court's insist-
ance on irreparable harm to the target company shareholders. Fur-
thermore, the lower court was ultimately ordered to "enter any inter-
locutory orders it deems desirable, compatible with the guidelines set
forth herein. 17 6 While this may allow the lower court further leeway
on remand, no decision has yet been rendered in the case or in other
similar cases by district courts located in the Ninth Circuit. As such,
no conclusions may yet be drawn regarding the circuit court's inter-
pretation of Rondeau.
The inroads which the Supreme Court's ruling in Rondeau71 have
made into the availability of preliminary injunctions have left the
Otis and Anaconda are consistent in their results with Myers; however, the ana-
lyses in the cases are vastly different. Myers directly relies on the Supreme Court's
holding in Rondeau to deny a motion for a preliminary injunction, while the courts in
Otis Elevator and Anaconda do not refer to Rondeau although all these cases were
decided in the Southern District of New York. Thus, confusion as to the effect of
Rondeau on preliminary injunction requests exists not only among the districts, but
also within one.
1, The Ninth Circuit was clear in its requirement of a showing of irreparable harm;
however, the court did not specify the parties to be protected or whether the party
seeking the injunction must show probable success on the merits. Rather, the court
intimated that the tendering shareholders must be faced with irreparable harm before
an injunction will issue, and that there must exist a probability of success on the
merits. 528 F.2d at 232. While this analysis follows the lead of Rondeau in seeking to
fulfill the policy of protecting target company shareholders, it overlooks that portion
of the legislative history of the Williams Act which explicitly warns against "tipping
the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bid." See note 58 supra. This one-dimensional analysis by the
Ninth Circuit may allow incumbent management to employ whatever defensive tech-
niques they wish to defeat the tender offer as long as irreparable harm to the sharehold-
ers will not ensue.
,' Chief Justice Burger noted in Rondeau that the Williams Act was not meant to
provide target company management with an additional weapon to combat tender
offers. 422 U.S. at 58-59. See also H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968),
reprinted at 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2813-14.
" 528 F.2d at 236.
422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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lower courts divided as to the proper standards which must be ap-
plied to motions for preliminary injunctive relief."8 Although the dis-
trict courts have not been uniform in their reliance on Rondeau, they
have reached ultimately consistent and reasonable results. The utili-
zation of the balancing of hardships test, as opposed to the irrepara-
ble harm standard evoked by the Supreme Court in Rondeau, is of
less significance than the manner in which the courts have ap-
proached the cases brought before them. The former practice of liber-
ally granting preliminary injunctive relief in tender offer cases,79 ap-
parently has been curtailed. Rather, the problems have been ap-
proached by the courts in a practical manner, with close examination
of the circumstances confronting the parties controlling the imple-
mentation of particular rules or standards. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, apparently has not approached the problem in this manner,
instead applying a rule with little concern for the factual situation
presented." This automatic application of Rondeau to tender offer
situations is not in keeping with the Supreme Court's analysis. The
Supreme Court criticized this strict rule-application analysis in
Rondeau. The Ninth Circuit's decision is Klaus v. Hi-Shear' is in
that sense similar to the opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Rondeau.2
A reflex-type reaction, such as that taken by the Ninth Circuit in
Klaus, also does not effectuate the purposes of the Williams Act.
Action taken on motions for preliminary injunctive relief often deter-
mines the success or failure of the tender offer.3 Moreover, relief
under the Williams Act is not intended to provide incumbent man-
7R Compare Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.
Tex. 1976); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975), and Myers
v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) with
Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Suplp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and
Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder], CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,364 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1975).
71 E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-22
(1973); Injunctions and Damages Under the Williams Act-Defensive Mechanisms,
Punitive Sanctions, Remedial Devices, Survey of 1974 Securities Law Developments,
32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 719, 777 (1975); Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try
a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 995 (1973).
'o See note 74 supra.
" 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
92 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 258-61 (2d Cir. 1975); Corenco
Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty Co.
v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Copperweld Corp. v.
Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See also Note, The Courts and the Williams
Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 1007-11 (1973).
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